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SEGREGATIVE INTENT AND THE SINGLE
GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY IN SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION
In Bradley v. Milliken [Detroit]," the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that it is within the power of a federal district court
to order implementation of a metropolitan area desegregation plan,
where the crossing of school district lines is necessary to eliminate de
jure segregation. Although the "white flight" to the suburbs has had
a profound impact on school desegregation and public education,2 De-
troit recognizes for the first time that the power exists to break down
the legal barriers that heretofore have perpetuated white suburban
"sanctuaries."
The alacrity with which the Sixth Circuit ordered a city-suburban
pupil exchange may be surpassed only by the eagerness with which
the Fourth Circuit disposed of a similar "consolidation" proposal.' In
Bradley v. School Board [Richmond],4 the Fourth Circuit reversed
the district court's order to implement a metropolitan desegregation
plan, on the grounds that the complete elimination of state-imposed seg-
gregation within the individual districts obviated further judicial in-
tervention. 5 The decision in the Richmond case was affirmed by an
equally divided Supreme Court,6 and therefore legal questions pertain-
ing to urban school desegregation persist.7
1. 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3300 (U.S. Nov. 20, 1973)
(Nos. 73-434 to -436).
2. It has been predicted that
ten or twenty years from now, if present trends continue unchecked, all but a
small minority of the Negro and white children who live in the major cities
and suburbs of urban America will attend separate schools. The contempo-
rary European caricature of the United States as a country in which self-
satisfied white people live prosperously in suburban sanctuaries which sur-
round our large cities or in high-rent urban residential areas and black citi-
zens live in decaying central city slums will be caricature no longer. A.
SCHECHTER, CONsTrrurxoNAL IssuEs 231 (1972).
Cf. A. BIcrEL, THE SUPREME CouRT AND THE IDEA OF PRoGRrss 132 (1970).
3. Other cases in which a metropolitan-wide solution has been or is being con-
sidered include United States v. Board of School Comm'rs [Indianapolis], 474 F.2d 81
(7th Cir. 1973) and Calhoun v. Cook [Atlanta], 469 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1972).
4. 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 93 S. Ct.
1952 (1973).
5. Id. at 1069.
6. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the decision.
7. See Note, Consolidation for Desegregation: The Unresolved Issue of the In-
evitable Sequel, 82 YALE L.J. 1681 (1973). The cited authority takes the position
that the holdings of Bradley v. Milliken and Bradley v. School Bd. are "directly con-
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The similarity of the underlying racial problems in Detroit and
Richmond cannot be ignored. Thus, while Detroit purports to dis-
tinguish itself from Richmond,8 the results reached in the two cases ap-
pear contradictory. 9 The Sixth Circuit held that the greater Detroit area
must be viewed as one large "dual" system amenable to one metro-
politan desegregation plan while the Fourth Circuit insisted that
the three school districts comprising the greater Richmond area can-
not be consolidated for purposes of school desegregation.' 0  This
Note will attempt to reconcile the two seemingly contradictory ap-
proaches by suggesting that both involve an inquiry as to the presence of
an unlawful metropolitan "intent to segregate," an intent which may ob-
jectively be imputed1 from the presence of segregated conditions
only if the area's school policies are significantly controlled by one
decision-making body. As a necessary preliminary to the detailed
consideration of Detroit and Richmond, this Note will briefly review
the basic de jure-de facto desegregation doctrine.
FINDING A METROPOLITAN VIOLATION
The Attack on State-Imposed Segregation
Application of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to school segregation cases has been a major judicial ac-
tivity"'2 since Chief Justice Warren concluded in Brown v. Board of
Education [Brown 1] that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inher-
ently unequal."' 3  The early desegregation cases that followed Brown
tradictory." Id. at 1684. This Note will argue that the two cases are reconcilable
even though they reach a different result.
8. 484 F.2d at 250-51.
9. See Note, supra note 7, at 1684.
It is recognized, of course, that the "aAW provides us with many examples
where a party may suffer identical harm under two different circumstances and have
a legal right to redress under one and not the other." Kaplan, Segregation Litigation
and the Schools-Part II: The General Northern Problem, 58 Nw. U.L. Rav. 157, 176
(1963).
10. The difference between a "unitary" system and a "dual" system is not sus-
ceptible of precise definition, but "dual" generally refers to a public system which
operates separate racially identifiable schools. See Alexander v. Holmes County Bd.
of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1967);
The Supreme Court 1971, Term, 86 HARV. L. Rav. 1, 65 (1972).
11. If intent may not be imputed, Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1 [Denver], 93 S. Ct.
2686 (1973), arguably mandates the introduction of other subjective factors to prove
a de jure intent to segregate.
12. Cf. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 6 (1971).
13. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). The Court noted that interpretation and applica-
tion of the doctrine is a dynamic process:
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when
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I struck down "officially imposed racial segregation in the schools"14 on
"the unassailable de jure ground of the discriminatory constitutional
and statutory provisions."' 5 Thus, since judicial activism concentrated
on those states which maintained two sets of schools within a single
system in order "to carry out a governmental policy to separate pupils
in schools solely on the basis of race,"' 6 constitutional standards
governed only school segregation resulting from state segregation laws
and not the de facto segregation resulting from a neighborhood school
policy in a residentially segregated community.' After the initial con-
stitutional assault on "overt statutory segregation," the judicial focus
turned to local compliance with the mandate of Brown I.Vs The in-
quiry as to whether a particular situation amounted to actionable de
jure segregation or constitutionally permissible de facto segregation no
longer was a straightforward mechanical process, for the issue of local
compliance did not confront the courts with highly visible discrimina-
tory state statutes. Nevertheless, by continually expanding the param-
eters of state action as a source of de jure segregation, 9 the Supreme
the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was
written. We must consider public education in the light of its full develop-
ment and its present place in American life throughout the Nation. Id. at
492-93.
14. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1 [Denver], 93 S. Ct. 2686, 2703 (1973) (Powell, I.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
15. Id. at 2708 n.15 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
16. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 6 (1971). See
also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1 [Denver], 93 S. Ct. 2686, 2703 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
17. See Spencer v. Kugler, 326 F. Supp. 1235 (D.N.J. 1971), affd mem., 404
U.S. 1027 (1972); Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 419 F.2d 1387 (6th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 962 (1971); Bell v. School City of Gary, 324 F.2d 209 (7th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964). See generally Goodman, De Facto
School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. Rpv. 275
(1972); Wright, Public School Desegregation: Legal Remedies for De Facto Segrega-
tion, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 285 (1965); Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 780 (1967).
18. See, e.g., Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972);
Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. County
School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Taylor v. Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961); Note, supra note 7, at 1687.
19. "With the growth of the concept of state action, 'de facto' may give way
to 'de jure' in all situations." Goldman, Benign Racial Classifications: A Constitu-
tional Dilemma, 35 U. CiN. L. REv. 349, 349-50 (1966).
In his concurring opinion in Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1 [Denver], Mr. Justice
Douglas argues for the abandonment of the de jure-de facto distinction on the grounds
that "each is the product of state actions or policies." 93 S. Ct. at 2701. Because
in his view a school board is an agency of the state, its actions-district gerryman-
dering, school site selection, pupil allocation, and budget preparation-therefore con-
stitute state action for fourteenth amendment purposes. Id. at 2700.
The approach of broadening the concept of state action as a means of reaching
de facto situations has been criticized because of the proof problems involved in estab-
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Court has, in effect, reserved the question of whether constitutional
standards also govern traditional de facto segregation.
20
The Renewed De Jure-De Facto Dichotomy
While the application of constitutional standards to de facto seg-
regation may become increasingly significant as the effects of prior de
jure segregation become attenuated with time,21 the most recent pro-
nouncement of the Supreme Court in the area of school desegregation
has renewed the vitality of the de jure-de facto distinction. In so doing,
the Court in Keyes v. School District No. 1 [Denver]22 held that the
essential element of actionable de jure segregation was a finding of
some official "intent to segregate": "We emphasize that the differen-
tiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segre-
gation to which we referred in Swann is purpose or intent to segre-
gate.)2 3
Denver involved a class action on behalf of Denver school chil-
dren against the city school board, alleging various segregative prac-
tices and conditions within the school district and seeking a decree
directing desegregation of the entire district. The Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Brennan, held that a determination of segrega-
tion brought about by intentional action of the board in a "meaningful"
segment of the system created a prima facie case of de jure segrega-
tion,24 which shifted to those authorities the burden of proving that
lishing the causal connection between the state action and its segregatory impact
and in establishing the requisite element of intent. Note, De Facto School Segregation
and the "State Action" Requirement: A Suggested New Approach, 48 IND. L.. 304,
310-15 (1973). The alternative solution offered is "to place a heavy presumption
of unconstitutionality on any racially identifiable school," and make it incumbent upon
the board of education "to show that no discrimination on its part played a role
in producing that racial dualism." Id. at 315. This suggested approach is similar
to that adopted by the Court in Denver. See notes 24 & 25 infra and accompanying
text. But the above formulation offered by Mr. Justice Douglas is hardly subject
to criticism on the ground that evidentiary problems would render it difficult to apply,
since his view of state action is so broad that problems of proof are significantly
reduced. For another advocate of this view, see Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Pub-
lic Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HAnv. L. REv. 564, 584 (1965): "[I]n
every case of racially imbalanced schools sufficient responsibility can be ascribed to
government to satisfy the requirement that stems from the equal protection clause's
proscription of unequal treatment by government." (Footnotes omitted.)
20. Cf. Swami v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1971);
41 U. Cnr. L. REv. 470, 480 (1972).
21. See 41 U. CN. L. Rv., supra note 20, at 480.
22. 93 S. Ct. 2686 (1973).
23. Id. at 2697 (footnotes omitted).
24. Id.
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other unchallenged segregated schools within the system were not the
product of a segregative intent.25  The Court did not find it necessary
to rule that "a school district that has committed de jure segregation
with respect to certain schools in a discrete area has a duty to deseg-
reate [sic] all schools throughout the district. '26  Rather, the Court
took the position that a finding of intentional segregation in one part
of a school district is "highly relevant" to the issue of the school board's
intent regarding other segregated areas of the district.
27
The newly resurrected "intent to segregate' inquiry2 8 may appar-
25. Id. at 2697-98.
26. Goodman, supra note 17, at 276 n.6.
27. 93 S. Ct. at 2697. Mr. Justice Powell attempted to summarize the majority
holding in Denver regarding the "new formulation" of what constituted a violation:
[DIesegregation will be ordered despite the absence of any segregatory
laws if: (i) segregated schools in fact exist; (ii) a court finds that they re-
sult from some action taken with segregatory intent by the school board;
(iii) such action relates to any "meaningful segment" of the school system;
and (iv) the school board cannot prove that its intentions with respect to the
remainder of the system were nonsegregatory. Id. at 2708 n.15 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
Mr. Justice Powell's interpretation apparently leaves little room for the imputation
of segregative intent, a conclusion the Sixth Circuit so readily reached in Detroit.
See notes 33-42 infra and accompanying text. It is clear that Mr. Justice Powell's use
of the term "school board" generally refers to the "duly constituted public authorities"
responsible for the particular segregative condition. Id. at 2705.
28. The rebirth of the "intent to segregate" standard came over the strong protests
of Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Douglas. Several arguments were raised to
support the abandonment of the de jure-de facto distinction. First, Mr. Justice Powell
pointed out that Denver was decided very shortly after Wright v. Council of City of
Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972), wherein the Court held motive irrelevant:
In addition, an inquiry into the "dominant" motivation of school authorities is
as irrelevant as it is fruitless. The mandate of Brown II was to desegregate
schools, and we have said that "[t]he measure of any desegregation plan is
its effectiveness." Davis v. School Commissioners of Mobile County, 402
U.S. 33, 37. Thus, we have focused upon the effect-not the purpose or
motivation-of a school board's action in determining whether it is a permis-
sible method of dismantling a dual system. Id. at 462, cited in Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1 [Denver], 93 S. Ct. 2686, 2708-09 (1973).
See also Cisneris v. Corpus Christi Independent School Dist., 467 F.2d 142, 150-
51, 151 n.7 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 3052 (1973). Mr. Justice Powell
does accept the distinction that in Wright a prior constitutional violation had al-
ready been proved, while in Denver the Court was fundamentally concerned with
the establishment of a violation. If this distinction is to be considered controlling,
the result which prevails is unsatisfactory to Mr. Justice Powell, for "[t]he net result
. . . is the application of an effect test to the actions of southern school districts and
an intent test to those in other sections, at least until an initial de jure finding for
those districts can be made." Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1 [Denver], 93 S. Ct. 2686,
2709 (1973).
Second, Mr. Justice Powell argued that a de jure-de facto distinction based on
motivation was inconsistent with the affirmative duty placed upon school authorities
to eliminate segregation "root and branch," see Green v. County School Bd., 391
U.S. 430, 437-38 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
15 (1973), because that duty requires alleviation of conditions "which in large part
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ently be satisfied in several ways. As was observed in United States v.
School Commissioners [Indianapolis] :29
[We can only emphasize that there are very few cases of school segre-
gation today in which the defendants admit that they had an improper
intent. Such intent may then be properly inferred from the objective
actions.30
Thus, the de jure "intent to segregate" may be imputed if two condi-
tions are satisfied: (1) segregated schools do in fact exist within the
area under consideration, and (2) the educational policy of the area
under consideration falls within the authority of one decision-making
body, such that the action or inaction of that body in promoting or
maintaining segregative conditions reasonably implies an intent to per-
petuate the segregative status quo.31 In Detroit, the Sixth Circuit con-
[do] not result from historic, state-imposed de jure segregation." 93 S. Ct. at 2704.
Third, a motivational inquiry would certainly run at cross-purposes with the en-
forcement of a student's constitutional right "to expect that once the State has assumed
responsibility for education, local school boards will operate integrated school systems
within their respective districts." Id. at 2706.
In addition to the constitutional arguments, Mr. Justice Powell offered policy rea-
sons for abandonment of the de jure-de facto criterion. Since the requirement of
segregative intent is an elusive one that will be difficult to apply and will give rise
to unpredictable and inconsistent results, id. at 2709-10, a student's exercise of his
constitutional rights will be unsatisfactorily contingent upon his particular geographical
location, id. at 2708. See also Goodman, supra note 17, at 437. He also questioned
the ability of a court to determine whether segregation exists in a "meaningful or
significant" portion of a school district. 93 S. Ct. at 2709. In conclusion, Mr. Justice
Powell stated: "Public schools are creatures of the State, and whether the segregation
is state-created or state-assisted or merely state-perpetuated should be irrelevant to
constitutional principle." Id. at 2707.
For a discussion of Mr. Justice Douglas' approach to the same problem, see note
19 supra.
29. 474 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1973).
30. Id. at 88 (emphasis added).
31. This is the fact situation which confronted the Sixth Circuit in Detroit. Some
commentators have suggested that the intent requirement be dropped altogether in
favor of a purely result-oriented approach. See generally Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg Case-Its Significance for Northern School Desegregation, 38 U. CHi. L. REV. 697
(1971). This approach focuses only on the segregated patterns themselves and is
therefore more responsive to the school segregation problems in Northern cities. Id.
at 706-07. See also Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 462 (1972);
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1 [Denver], 93 S. Ct. 2686, 2709 (1973) (Powell, I., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). This approach itself is subject to criticism
under the theory that the mere fact that an injury is identified does not necessarily
mean that the injured is entitled to relief. See note 9 supra. Kaplan, speaking about
this objection to the result-oriented approach in the context of school districting on a
geographical basis, starts from the proposition that
because the same harm is visited upon Negro children by districting on purely
geographical lines as would be visited by racial segregation under force of
law, the geographical districting must therefore be unconstitutional. In a
sense, this is reasoning from the converse of the Brown and post-Brown
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fronted both conditions.32 But if more than one decision-making body
exercises authority in the area, more than one intention or purpose is
necessarily involved, and thus a segregative singleness of purpose can-
not be imputed to the collective body of decision-makers. Rather, a
subjective analysis of each decision-maker's intention to comply, to the
extent of its authority, with the requirement of eliminating segregation is
required of the court. Such was the analysis in effect undertaken by
the Fourth Circuit in Richmond.
Detroit-Imputing Segregative Intent
The history of Detroit dates back to April 7, 1970, when the De-
troit Board of Education adopted a desegregation plan designed to
achieve better racial balance within the city schools of Detroit.3
Michigan's state legislature responded to this effort by enacting Act 48
of the Public Acts of 1970,11 Section 12 of which delayed implementa-
tion of the plan. 5 Subsequently the plaintiffs in this action, individ-
ual black and white children, their parents, and the NAACP, brought
an action against the Board of Education of the City of Detroit and
various state and local officials, challenging the constitutionality of Act
48 and seeking implementation of the desegregation plan. During
the course of the ensuing litigation, Act 48 was declared unconstitu-
tional by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, but the district
court's subsequent denial of a motion for immediate implementation of
the April 7 plan was upheld pending trial on the merits of plaintiffs'
allegations that the Detroit schools were segregated. At trial, the dis-
trict court held "that both the State of Michigan and the Detroit Board
of Education have committed acts which have been causal factors in the
segregated condition of the public schools of the City of Detroit."36
The court further observed that "[tihe principal causes undeniably have
been population movement and housing patterns, but state and local
governmental actions, including school board actions, have played a
cases. Kaplan, supra note 9, at 176.
But this criticism is not necessarily fatal to the result-oriented approach. If the
view of Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion in Denver is adopted, then
there is a constitutional violation whenever there is a segregated condition in public
education. 93 S. Ct. at 2701.
32. But cf. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 19, Milliken v. Bradley, cert. granted,
42 U.S.L.W. 3300 (U.S. Nov. 20, 1973) (No. 73-434).
33. Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 219 (6th Cir. 1973).
34. No. 48, § 12, [1970] Mich. Pub. Acts 139, declared unconstitutional by the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Bradley v. Milliken, 433 F.2d 897 (6th
Cir. 1970).
35. 484 F.2d at 219.
36. 338 F. Supp. 582, 592 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (emphasis added).
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substantial role in promoting segregation. '3 7  After further proceed-
ings the lower court reached the conclusion that an adequately deseg-
regated school system could not be established within the Detroit school
district, and ordered preparation of a metropolitan-wide plan to in-
clude cross district transportation of school children. The district court
also tentatively defined the specific desegregation area to cover a fifty-
four school district area. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court's
finding of a violation-a determination that the unconstitutional seg-
regative acts of the defendants, as officials or instrumentalities of the
state, in validating and augmenting the effect of residential segregation,
amounted to de jure segregation.38
Several factors undoubtedly influenced the court in its factual de-
termination that the educational system for the entire area was under
the control of a single decision-making authority. Michigan's four con-
stitutions make it clear that the Michigan public school system is solely
a state function.39 Furthermore, the school systems throughout the
state are highly regulated by state laws, and "local school districts are
instrumentalities of the State for administrative convenience. '40  The
extent to which Michigan exercises control over the local school dis-
tricts is exemplified by the attempt of the legislature to repeal Detroit's
desegregation plan by enactment of Act 48.41 From this level of
state control and involvement, the Sixth Circuit concluded that "the
segregative actions and inactions of the Detroit Board of Education...
are the actions of an agency of the State of Michigan."42
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. 484 F.2d at 242.
39. See MIcH. CONST. art. VII, § 2 & art. VIII, H§ 1-3 (1963); MICH. CONsT. art.
X, § 2 & art. XI, § 9 (1908); MIcH. CONST. art. XII, § 4 (1850); MicH, CONST.
art. X, § 3 (1835). See also Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 245-46 (6th Cir.
1973).
40. 484 F.2d at 246. The court noted the following as exemplary of state legislative
control over public education:
- . . The Michigan School Code reaffirms the ultimate control of the State
over public education. Local school districts must observe all State laws re-
lating to schools, hold school a minimum number of days per year, employ
only certified teachers, teach civics, health and physical education and driv-
ers' education, excuse students to attend religious instruction classes, observe
State requirements when teaching sex education, make annual financial and
other reports to the Superintendent of Public Instruction and must follow
all rules and regulations of the State Department of Education. Id. at 248-49
(footnotes omitted).
In addition, the State Board of Education which is created by, and derives power
from, the legislature, has the authority to merge districts and to withhold funds. Id.
at 247-49. For the fifty-four school districts involved in the Detroit metropolitan plan,
an average of 34 percent of the operating budgets is contributed by the state. Id.
at 248.
41. Id. at 249. The court did not find it necessary to point out the overt level
of intent involved in the action of the legislature.
42, Id. at 238. The segregative actions and inactions which were accorded the
[Vol. 1973:1111
Vol. 1973:1111] URBAN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
Richmond-Fragmented Decision-Making
In Richmond, the Fourth Circuit was faced with a case of alleged
segregation within certain school districts in a state with a prior history
of statutorily imposed segregation. The district court had moreover
concluded:
The City of Richmond's present pattern of residential housing contains
well defined Black and White areas, which undoubtedly is a reflection
of past racial discrimination contributed in part by local, state and
federal government. 43
Despite the willingness of the trial court in essence to impute an intent
to segregate from past governmental actions, the Fourth Circuit held
that "the last vestiges of state-imposed segregation have been wiped out
in the public schools of the City of Richmond and the Counties of
Henrico and Chesterfield. .... ,,44
In failing to uphold the district court's decision to impute the req-
uisite intent, the court recognized a separate and distinct decision-mak-
ing authority functioning in each of the political subdivisions compris-
ing the metropolitan area. The Fourth Circuit based its conclusion as
to the fragmented nature of decision-making authority in the Virginia
public school system on the following analysis: the court first cited
case law authority supporting the proposition that the power to oper-
ate public schools in Virginia is, unlike in Michigan,45 "within the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the local school boards and not within the juris-
diction of the State Board of Education. ' 46  Furthermore, the court
observed that, unlike in Michigan, under Virginia constitutional and
statutory law the State Board of Education acting alone lacked the
power to effect consolidation of separate school districts into a single
rank of state action and which were therefore found to be constitutional violations
were (1) segregative zoning and assignment practices, id. at 221; (2) the use of "op-
tional areas," (where pupils in an area were provided with a choice of attending either
of two designated schools), id. at 232; and (3) building construction and site selection,
id. at 235.
43. 338 F. Supp. at 72. The segregative acts found by the district court included
violations in the selection of school construction sites, id. at 86-87; the drawing of
attendance zones to conform to segregatory residential patterns, id. at 82-83; and a
past practice of transporting students across district lines to maintain segregation, id.
at 83. As in Detroit, the constitutional violations were imputed to the state defend-
ants, who were also found to have committed specific violations. Note, supra note 7,
at 1685.
44. 462 F.2d at 1070.
45. See notes 39-42 supra and accompanying text.
46. Bradley v. School Bd., 462 F.2d 1058, 1067 (4th Cir. 1972), affd by an
equally divided Court, 93 S. Ct. 1952 (1973), citing County School Bd. v. Griffin,
204 Va. 650, 133 S.E.2d 565 (1963).
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system under the control of a single school board, and that local school
boards were fiscally dependent upon the local governing bodies. 47
Having established that the decision-making authority is held pri-
marily at the local level, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the intent
to segregate cannot be imputed from segregatory conditions throughout
the metropolitan area. Rather, the inquiry must be directed toward
the subjective intent demonstrated by the various decision-making units.
The court clearly conducted this factual inquiry: 48
[N]either the record nor the opinion of the district court even suggests
that there was ever joint interaction between any two of the units in-
volved (or by higher state officers) for the purpose of keeping one
unit relatively white by confining blacks to another.49
Thus, the Fourth Circuit not only failed to impute an intent to segre-
gate from segregatory conditions but also failed to find any subjective
motivation on the part of the metropolitan authorities to perpetuate ra-
cial imbalance.5"
The Sixth Circuit in Detroit expressly attempted to reconcile its
approach to the metropolitan segregation problem with that of the
Richmond case on two grounds: (1) Richmond involved an order to
consolidate immediately three separate school districts while Detroit
merely involved a direction to study plans for the reassignment of pupils
47. 462 F.2d at 1067-68.
48. A case relied upon by the majority in Richmond, 462 F.2d at 1070, and by
the dissenters in Detroit, 484 F.2d at 261-62, 277, is Spencer v. Kugler, 326 F. Supp.
1235 (D.N.J. 1971), aff'd mem., 404 U.S. 1027 (1972). Spencer was a class action
on behalf of black school children in New Jersey alleging that racial imbalance in the
public schools of that state resulting from the drawing of school district lines coincident
with municipal boundaries amounted to a denial of equal protection. In holding that the
imbalance amounted to a situation of irremedial de facto segregation, the court stated:
The setting of municipalities as local school districts is a reasonable stand-
ard especially in light of the municipal taxing authority. The system as
provided by the various legislative enactments is unitary in nature and intent
and any purported racial imbalance within a local school district results from
an imbalance in the population of that municipality-school district. Racially
balanced municipalities are beyond the pale of either judicial or legislative
intervention. Id. at 1240 (emphasis added).
Actually Spencer contributes little to the problem of reconciling Richmond and De-
troit because, while involving only one decision-making authority to which de jure
intent might be imputed, "there was no allegation that state action caused or contrib-
uted to the racial imbalance." Bradley v. School Bd. [Richmond], 462 F.2d 1058, 1079
(4th Cir. 1972) (Winger, J., dissenting). The distinction between Spencer and the facts
of Richmond proposed by the dissent in Richmond, also offers little to this discussion,
that distinction being that Virginia had a history of state-imposed segregation while
New Jersey did not. Id. If that distinction were controlling both Detroit and Rich-
mond should have been decided differently.
49. Bradley v. School Bd., 462 F.2d 1058, 1065 (4th Cir. 1972) (emphasis added).
50. Cf. Note, supra note 7, at 1684.
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in the metropolitan Detroit area;5 and (2) the jurisdiction of localities
over schools in Virginia is exclusive, while in Michigan there is con-
siderable state involvement in local school affairs.2 The first distinc-
tion is unconvincing as it exalts form over substance. However, the
second distinction, while understandably failing to link explicitly the state
involvement inquiry to the "intent to segregate test," nevertheless con-
forms to the approach offered as a basis for reconciliation by this
Note.53
CROSS-DISTRICT ASSIGNMENT AS A REMEDY FOR
DE JURE SEGREGATION
Upon the establishment of a metropolitan intent to segregate, the
question arises as to the type of remedy the courts are empowered to
apply. In this vein, the cross-district assignment of school children has
been termed a disruptive and ill-conceived "legal monstrosity.954
51. 484 F.2d at 251.
52. Id.
53. Any attempt to reconcile Richmond and Detroit within the context of the
basic constitutional doctrine as now prescribed by Denver may be complicated by
the fact that neither the Fourth nor the Sixth Circuit anticipated the forthcoming
Denver intent test. (Richmond was decided on June 5, 1972, and affirmed by an
equally divided Supreme Court without opinion on May 21, 1973; Detroit was decided
by the Sixth Circuit en banc on June 12, 1973; and Denver was handed down by
the Supreme Court on June 21, 1973). Furthermore, both cases involved multidistrict
problems while Denver was concerned with but a single school district. Neither
ground for distinction affects the validity of the analytical framework developed in
this Note, although the latter does complicate the practicality of applying the Denver
standard because the requisite intent to segregate must be subjectively established over
a multidistrict area where more than one decision-making authority may be involved.
A court faced with this more difficult inquiry might find it desirable to ease the
plaintiff's burden by adopting another suggestion from Denver. In Denver the Court
held that a showing of intentional segregative policy on the part of school authorities
in a "meaningful segment" of a school district not only constituted a prima facie
case that a violation existed within that portion of the district, but also shifted the
burden of proof to the school authorities to show "that their actions as to other
segregated schools within the system were not also motivated by segregative intent."
93 S. Ct. at 2697-98. The Court explained under what circumstances this burden-
shifting principle can be employed: '"There are no hard and fast standards governing
the allocation of the burden of proof in every situation. The issue, rather, 'is merely
a question of policy and fairness based on experience in the different situations.'
Id. at 2698, quoting 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2486 (3d ed. 1940). In the multi-
district situation a court might accept a showing of intentional segregative school
policy within a "meaningful segment" (e.g., a single school district) of a metropolitan
area as a prima facie case of a constitutional violation for the entire metropolitan
area and shift the burden to the various decision-making authorities involved to show
otherwise.
54. Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 260 (6th Cir. 1973) (dissenting opinion).
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Brown 11, 51 which set forth the basic doctrine to govern the implemen-
tation of the mandate of Brown I, characterized the principles of equity
to be applied in fashioning remedies as follows: "Traditionally, equity
has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its reme-
dies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private
needs. '5 6  In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 7
which presents a complete statement of judicial desegregation reme-
dies, the Court held that a district court has broad equitable powers
to remedy problems of segregation once a constitutional right and
a violation thereof have been established.5 8 Although "the list [of
remedies] is open-ended in the civil rights cases, and is limited only
by scope of the practical considerations of enforcement,"50 a remedial
decree in any equity case must also be judged by its effectiveness, 0
must be limited in scope by the nature of the violation,6' and must be
confined to the achievement of its objective, which in desegregation
cases is held to be the dismantling of a dual school system.02
Detroit held that it is within the equity power of a district court
to require a metropolitan area desegregation plan which involves cross-
district assignment of school children. The court's rationale was pred-
icated on the initial determination that there was sufficient evidence in
the record to support the district court's finding that a constitutionally
adequate desegregation plan could not be developed within the Detroit
school system alone. 3  Thus, with the identification of a constitutional
'55. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown 11).
56. Id. at 300, citing Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944); Alexander
v. Hillman, 296 U.S. 222, 239 (1935). See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 93 S. Ct. 1463,
1469 (1973); Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 375 F.2d 158, 165 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 931 (1967); Armstrong v. Board of Educ., 323 F.2d 333, 340 (5th Cir.
1963); H. McCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQurry § 30 (2d ed. 1948);
Note, supra note 7, at 1690.
57. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
58. Id. at 15.
59. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON Tr LAw OF REMEDIES § 7.4, at 534 (1973).
60. See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
61. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
62. Id. at 28. Recognizing that the scope of the remedial powers is not unlim-
ited, Chief Justice Burger did not offer any "fixed guidelines," but did note that the
remedial authority did not put judges in the shoes of school officials. Id. at 27;
Note, supra note 7, at 1690. Cf. Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S.
451, 477 (1972) (Burger, J., dissenting): "Mhe invocation of remedial jurisdiction is
not equivalent to having a school district placed in receivership."
63. Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 245 (6th Cir. 1973). Consider the language
of the court:
This court never before has been confronted by a finding that any less
comprehensive a solution than a metropolitan area plan would result in an all
black school system immediately surrounded by practically all white suburban
school systems, with an overwhelmingly white majority population in the to-
tal metropolitan area.
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right and a violation of that right, the court affirmed the power of a
district court to remedy the violation. 64  In defining the extent of that
power, the Sixth Circuit theorized that the mandate of Brown I would
be nullified if the school district boundaries surrounding the city were
held to be inviolable even after a de jure intent to segregate had been
attributed to the metropolitan authorities. 65 The net result would, of
course, be the restoration of the doctrine of separate but equal schools. 66
Relying heavily upon Swann," the court in Detroit concluded that ar-
tificial school district boundary lines are not absolute: "If school
boundary lines cannot be changed for an unconstitutional purpose, it
follows logically that existing boundary lines cannot be frozen for an
unconstitutional purpose."6 8  In Richmond, it is difficult to identify
with precision exactly how the power of a district court to remedy a
violation is regarded by the Fourth Circuit since that court was unable
to discern a constitutional violation in the establishment or maintenance
of the three school districts. 69
CONCLUSION
The thesis of this Note has been that Richmond and Detroit are, in
theory at least, reconcilable within the de jure-de facto framework as
recently constructed in Denver.70  Judicial inquiry is not foreclosed
64. While agreeing with the district court's conclusion that it can fashion a metro-
politan-wide desegregation plan, the court of appeals expressed no opinion as to the
specific desegregation area defined by the lower court. Id. at 252. The court also
vacated the district court's order dated July 11, 1972, to purchase 295 school buses
as premature. The use of this device as a remedy was not ruled out, however, pending
approval of a final desegregation plan. Id.
65. See 484 F.2d at 249.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 255-58.
68. Id. at 250.
69. 462 F.2d at 1069. The court does recognize the power to consolidate where
there is a determination of invidious discrimination in the establishment or main-
tenance of local governmental units. Id. at 1060.
70. The question remains, of course, whether the basis for reconciliation offered
here presents the courts with a suitable basis for deciding cases in the future. On
the strength of Denver, this Note has accepted the de jure-de facto distinction as
an apparently continuing factor to be reckoned with. It is recognized that this basic
test itself is subject to considerable criticism. See Goodman, supra note 17, at 435.
Not only is the distinction subject to the same criticisms as were leveled at it
by Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Powell in Denver, but it is also particularly
suspect in the metropolitan situation where more than one decision-making authority
is involved, because the motivation of several school districts regarding their actions
or inactions concerning the school policies of each other will be even more difficult
to establish and will lead to even more unpredictable and inconsistent results. Fur-
thermore, there is a tendency among judges to regard a remedy such as the metropoli-
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by platitudes extolling or denigrating the sanctity of school district
boundaries. Rather, the focus on illegal de jure purpose or intent is
defined by the scope of the authority of the decision-making organ
whose actions or inactions are being questioned in light of segregative
conditions. Where segregated patterns in fact exist within a metro-
politan area, and where there is one decision-making authority re-
sponsible for school policy in that area, it is logically possible from
the objective circumstances to impute the requisite intent in order to
find de jure desegregation. But where local decision-making authori-
ties control school policy from autonomous political subdivisions com-
prising a metropolitan area, there must be a subjective showing of a
collective effort purposely to bring about or maintain segregative con-
ditions.71  Once a violation is established, there appears to be little dis-
tan solution as punishment rather than remedy. Cf. Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d
215, 260 (6th Cir. 1973) (dissenting opinion): "Mhe adjoining three counties and
the fifty-two school districts [should not] be penalized because they are located near
Detroit" (emphasis added). If there has been a showing that racial imbalance
in an urban area has resulted from segregative actions of state or local officials
in promoting or perpetuating that imbalance, and if a solution cannot be effected
within the boundaries of that city, the involvement of outlying areas should not
be regarded by the judiciary as suburban punishment. Nor should such a solu-
tion be prohibited on the ground that the local authorities did not purposely contrib-
ute to the maintenance of segregative conditions in the urban area, because the metro-
politan solution is a remedy for the existing violation and the scope of the remedy
must be great enough to erase the violation.
71. It is recognized that the test proposed by this Note is necessarily difficult to
apply because a variety of factors must be considered in order to identify the govern-
mental decision-making entity for a particular area. It might therefore be of some
value to speculate as to the probable outcome of the application of the test in one or
two other jurisdictions.
In New York, for example, the Commissioner of Education has "exceedingly wide
powers in any matter relating to the vast educational system of the State," Beam v.
Wilson, 279 App. Div. 277, 110 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1952), and has exclusive jurisdiction "in
all matters relating to the supervision and control of the public school system, the
discipline of the schools and the management of the school property and the authority
and discretionary acts on the part of officers or agencies of education," Bomar v. Cole,
177 Misc. 740, 32 N.Y.S.2d 825 (S. Ct. 1941). The Commissioner is chosen by, and
serves at the pleasure of, the Board of Regents, N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 302-03 (MeKinney
1969), and vacancies on the Board of Regents are filled by the New York Legislature,
id. § 202. The Board of Regents is, therefore, an agency of the state and the Com-
missioner is a servant of that agency. The Commissioner's broad powers over local
school matters include: (1) the power to "annul upon cause shown to his satisfaction
any certificate of qualification granted to a teacher by any authority whatever," id.
§ 305(7); (2) the power to remove, subsequent to a hearing, any trustee, member of a
board of education, superintendent of schools, or other school officer for any wilful
violation of a duty imposed by state law or for wilfully disobeying any order, rule or
regulation of the regents or the Commissioner, id. § 306(1); (3) the power to withhold
public money from any school district for its wilfully disobeying any provision of law
or any decision, order, or regulation of the regents or the Commissioner, id. § 306(2);
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pute that the scope of the remedy is limited only by the scope of the
violation.
and (4) the power to "reorganize" local school districts, id. § 314. While the Com-
missioner does not have the power to consolidate districts without the consent of the
local board of education, id. § 1524, he may order a change in school district bounda-
ries by means of reorganization without the board's consent under § 314. Board of
Trustees v. Commissioner of Educ., 37 App. Div. 2d 743, 322 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1971).
Regarding the specific area of school desegregation, the Board of Regents has declared
racially imbalanced schools to be educationally inadequate. Vetere v. Allen, 15 N.Y.2d
259, 258 N.Y.S.2d 77, 206 N.E.2d 174, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 825 (1965). Where the
Commissioner has taken action to implement this policy by directing a school board to
reorganize attendance zones, his determination is conclusive, "absent a showing of pure
arbitrariness." Id. See also Radford v. Gage, 59 Misc. 2d 948, 301 N.Y.S.2d 282
(S. Ct. 1969). Considering this extensive power over local school policy that is vested
in an agency of the state of New York, it is not unlikely that a court, faced with a
set of facts similar to those presented in Detroit and Richmond, would conclude that a
single governmental decision-making authority is involved.
In Illinois, the outcome of the application of the test is not quite so clear. The
legislature has delegated to the local political subdivisions the power to create new
school districts or to change school district boundaries by detachment, annexation, di-
vision, dissolution, or consolidation. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 7-1 to -2 (Smith-Hurd
1962). But it is clear that this delegation of power is permissive and not exclusive. It
is merely a matter of legislative policy to leave to the resident voters the settlement of
questions involving school district boundaries. People ex rel. Small v. Board of Educ.,
343 Ill. App. 362, 99 N.E.2d 385 (1951). Accordingly, the local subdivisions are con-
sidered to be acting as "agents of the legislature." Board of Educ. v. Board of Educ.,
11 Ill. App. 2d 408, 415, 137 N.E.2d 721, 725 (1956). See also People ex rel. Com-
munity Unit School Dist. No. 1 v. Decatur School Dist. No. 61, 45 Ill. App. 2d 33, 194
N.E.2d 659 (1964). The legislature has retained complete power over the school dis-
trict boundaries: "The area comprising a school district may be divided, contracted or
abolished at the will of the legislature." Board of Educ. v. Board of Educ., 11 Ill.
App. 2d 408, 415, 137 N.E.2d 721, 725 (1956). See also Community Unit School
Dist. No. 6 v. County Bd., 9 MI1. App. 2d 116, 132 N.E.2d 584 (1956). In the specific
area of discrimination in schools, the legislature has retained control over policy by
providing that upon the filing of a complaint signed by 50 residents of a district or by
ten percent of the residents of a district, whichever is lesser, the Superintendent of
Public Instruction (an elected state official) shall direct that there be a hearing upon
the allegations. If the Superintendent of Public Instruction determines that a viola-
tion exists, he shall request the Attorney General to apply to the appropriate court to
rectify the practice. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 22-19 (Smith-Hurd 1962). In addi-
tion, the Illinois Legislature has provided that for cities of over 500,000 inhabitants the
city will constitute one school district under the charge of one board of education. Id.
§ 34-2. Among the powers granted to this board is the power to subdivide the district
into attendance zones, but with the direction that "no pupil shall be excluded from or
segregated in any such school on account of his color, race, sex or nationality." Id.
§ 34-18. Furthermore, the legislature has provided that the board has an affirmative
duty to make periodic revision of attendance zones in order to prevent segregation.
Id., as amended, (Supp. 1973). While much of the power over local school policy in
Illinois has been delegated to the local political subdivisions, it is clear that these local
authorities act as agents of the state and with the permission of the legislature. Further-
more, the state has retained direct control over policy involving school desegregation
matters. Thus, it appears likely that a court would identify a single governmental
decision-making entity for a multidistrict problem arising in Illinois.
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